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In 1975 Professor Boris Bittker wrote a comprehensive article entitled
Federal Income Taxation and the Family.' Later that year, David and
Angela Boyter obtained the first in a series of three divorces.2 The
Boyters undertook year-end-divorce/year-beginning-marriage ceremo-
nies in 1975-76 and in 1976-77,1 not because of marital discord but
rather to "upgrade" their income tax filing status from married to
single.
The Boyters illustrate a problem addressed by Professor Bittker in
the second part of his article.4 They, like many other dual income mar-
ried couples, pay a higher income tax on their combined salaries be-
cause they are married than they would pay if they were single. What
set the Boyters apart from the majority of this group is the self-help
remedy they employed to reduce this tax burden. While the efficacy of
* A.B., University of Michigan, 1966; M.B.A., University of Michigan, 1967;
J.D., Duke University, 1971; Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for
the Study of Law.
1. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389
(1975).
2. The Boyters' divorces have been the subject of various articles, both scholarly
and those designed for popular reading. See, e.g., Note, The Haitian Vacation: The
Applicability of Sham Doctrine to Year-End Divorces, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1332 (1979);
Comment, Congressional Sanction of Illicit Cohabitation-The Tax Reform Act of
1969, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 940 (1979); Richmond, Divorce American Style (For
Taxes), NOVA PERSPECTIVE, Spring 1980, at 4; Griping Grows Louder Over "Marriage
Tax," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 29, 1979, at 71; Kaminski, The Marriage
Penalty & Other Taxing Aspects of Wedded Life, Nat'l L.J., June 2, 1980, at 24, col.
1; Main, Making Marriage Less Taxing, MONEY, Jan. 1980, at 47; McIntyre, Individ-
ual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L.
REV. 469 (1980).
3. Their 1977 divorce was not followed by remarriage. The couple continues to
live together, however.
4. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1416-44.
1
Richmond: The Marriage Penalty: Restructuring Federal Law To Remedy Tax Bur
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
32 Nova Law Journal 5:1980
that remedy has been placed in doubt by the Tax Court's recent deci-
sion upholding the government's challenge to the validity of the 1975
and 1976 divorces,5 the problems illustrated by the Boyters' actions
must be faced by Congress shortly,8 whether or not a successful appeal
is taken from the Tax Court decision.7 Several bills already await ac-
tion by Congress, 8 and some state governments have implemented al-
ternatives to what has been called the "marriage penalty.", This article
5. Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. -, Nos. 11445-77 & 11446-77 (Aug. 6,
1980). Although the Internal Revenue Service attacked the 1975 and 1976 divorces as
shams, it has not done so with respect to the 1977 divorce, in which the Boyters be-
came permanently unmarried. Compare Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40, with IRS
Private Letter Ruling 7835076 (1978). The Tax Court did not reach the government's
contention that the Boyter divorces were shams for purposes of federal law, as it was
able to decide the marital status question on state law grounds. Because the Boyters
remained Maryland domiciliaries while obtaining divorces in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, Judge Wilbur determined that "Maryland would not recognize the foreign
divorces as valid to terminate the marriage. . . . " 74 T.C. at _. The opinion con-
tains an extensive discussion of state recognition of foreign divorce decrees. This discus-
sion was deemed necessary because there was no Maryland decision directly addressing
this issue and the court was forced to choose the rule it felt the Maryland high court
would have adopted. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
6. Both the Democratic and Republican platforms state their respective parties'
opposition to the "marriage penalty." See, e.g., Democratic Party platform plank on
"Women and the Economy," approved by the platform committee on June 24, 1980;
Republican Party platform plank on "Strong Families," approved by the convention on
July 15, 1980. Already introduced in Congress and awaiting action are over thirty bills
dealing with the problem in one way or another. These bills are listed by type in Ap-
pendix I infra and are discussed later in this article at pp. 45-54 infra.
7. Because the Boyters reside in Maryland, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit would hear any appeal. In its recent decision in Ensminger v.
Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979), that court noted various cases in which
the different tax rate schedules had survived challenges to their constitutionality. Id. at
192. Earlier in the opinion, the court remarked that certain inequalities in tax conse-
quences may result from residence in one state as opposed to another, "but it illustrates
the deference Congress has demonstrated for state laws in this area and its attempts to
insure that, in the application of federal tax laws, taxpayers will be treated in their
intimate and personal relationships as the state in which they reside treats them." Id.
at 191. Only if the court of appeals disagrees with the Tax Court on the state law issue
will the sham issue be raised again in Boyter.
8. See Appendix i infra.
9. Later in this article the tax systems of New York, North Carolina and Ohio
will be discussed as illustrating issues raised by the various alternatives for federal
2
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will discuss the suggested solutions and offer further proposals for legis-
lative study.
A Brief Historical Perspective
One can best understand the conflicting viewpoints which resulted
in Boyter if that case is viewed from a historical perspective. The major
federal ° taxes that affect residents of the United States are the income
tax and the various taxes imposed on gratuitous property transfers, gift,
estate and generation skipping transfer taxes. To some extent, but by
no means entirely, the amount of these taxes paid by any particular
individual is dependent upon his or her marital status. Thus, the focal
point of the material which follows is the use of marital status in legis-
lation and judicial decisions affecting federal tax liability.
The first income tax statute,"1 assessing a flat three percent tax on
incomes in excess of eight hundred dollars,12 did not mention marital
status; the tax was imposed on the income of "every person."13 Subse-
quent Civil War era income tax statutes did not vary in this regard,1
4
nor did the short-lived 1894 Act.1
5
action. See pp. 54-57 infra.
10. Because not all of the states levy income or transfer taxes, and because those
which do have not opted for uniformity in approach, discussion in this section will be
limited to federal taxes. But see Appendix II infra for a comparison of certain charac-
teristics of state income tax laws.
11. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309. Although repealed less than
a year later, Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 473, its treatment of individu-
als was repeated in subsequent legislation. See statutes cited in note 14 infra.
12. Because the first $800 was exempt from this tax, a slight degree of progres-
sion did exist.
13. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309. So long as the tax was
essentially proportional in nature, married couples who both had income paid the same
amount of tax they would have paid had they been single and living together and the
same amount on two separate returns as would have been due had a combined return
been allowed or required.
14. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 473; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 74,
§ 11, 12 Stat. 723; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 281; Act of Mar. 3,
1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 479.
15. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553, declared unconstitutional
as an unapportioned direct tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
affid on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
33 1
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In 1913 Congress enacted the first post-sixteenth amendment in-
come tax statute.16 As the committee reports indicate, marital status
was considered relevant to an individual's tax burden. While the first
$3,000 of a single individual's income was deductible in computing tax-
able income, married couples could exempt the first $4,000.17 In ex-
plaining its decision to vary the exemption from the flat $4,000 deduc-
tion proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate Finance
Committee stated: "[I]t is deemed equitable as recognizing the added
obligations on account of marriage and children and salutary as em-
phasizing the family as the unit in our social structure." 18
Because each individual filed a tax return based upon his or her
own income, two single individuals living together could take advantage
of $6,000 in exemptions if each had income of at least $3,000; if only
one had any income, there would be only one $3,000 exemption. 9 A
married couple living together2 could exempt no more than $4,000 re-
gardless of how much income each earned. By the same token, that
couple could exempt the full $4,000 even if only one spouse earned
income.21
In one respect the married and the single individual received iden-
tical treatment. Each was subjected to tax only on his or her own in-
come. This was an important consideration for married couples, be-
cause the 1913 tax rates were graduated, 22 and in almost every
instance a higher tax would be due if two incomes were combined on
the same return than if each spouse filed a return reporting only one
income.23
In fact, the 1913 income tax provisions differentiated more be-
16. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166.
17. Id. § II(C).
18. S. REP. No. 80, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1913).
19. The same result would obtain for two single individuals who were not living
with any other person.
20. The House version provided that each spouse should be entitled to a $3,000
exemption if the couple was living separate and apart from each other. S. REP. No. 80,
supra note 18, at 24.
21. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(C), 38 Stat. 168.
22. Rates ranged from 1% on the first $1,000 of taxable income to as high as 7%
on taxable incomes in excess of $500,000.
23. If one spouse had a net loss which could have offset the other spouse's in-
come, combining the two incomes would result in lower tax liability.
134 Nova Law Journal 5:19801
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tween married couples deriving a substantial portion of their income
from property and those receiving their income from salary, and be-
tween married couples in community property states and those residing
in common law jurisdictions, than they did between married and single
taxpayers. In the first instance, where income was derived from prop-
erty, full advantage could be taken of income splitting if the couple
divided ownership of the property rather than having only one spouse
hold title. Because there were no federal transfer taxes in effect in
1913, property ownership could be arranged to allow income splitting
without the imposition of an inhibiting transfer tax. As single taxpayers
also could make use of property transfers to affect their tax conse-
quences, marital status conferred neither benefit nor detriment.
When Congress enacted an estate tax in 1916, it failed to include
a tax on inter vivos transfers. 4 Thus, property transfers to equalize
income remained an effective tax reduction tool in a time period when
income tax rates underwent a significant increase in the degree of their
progressivity.25
Although the 1920s were generally a period of income tax reduc-
tion,26 a gift tax was enacted in 1924 to limit what might otherwise be
deemed the voluntary nature of the estate tax.27 Two years later this
tax was repealed, and property owners continued to be favored over
salaried workers with respect to their opportunities for tax reduction.2 8
The community property/common law jurisdiction distinction be-
came important as soon as tax rates were graduated. The eight commu-
24. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 200 et seq., 39 Stat. 777.
25. The maximum combined rate was increased from 7% in 1913 to 15% in 1916
and to 67% in 1917. The rapid increases in tax rates can be explained by the unprece-
dented funding needs occasioned by World War I. Although the income tax itself was
not increased until 1916, additional excise taxes were levied in 1914 to replace customs
revenue lost during what was then the European War. See S. REP. No. 813, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). The 1916 increases were attributed in part to the need to
fortify the country, while the 1917 increases were passed to "defray war expenses."
H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916); H.R. REP. No. 45, 65th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1917).
26. At the time the final bill of the decade was enacted, the maximum individual
income tax rate was 25%. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 11-12, 45 Stat. 795-97.
27. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 319, 43 Stat. 313.
28. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200(a), 44 Stat. 126.
351
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nity property states2" treated married couples as a form of partnership,
with the result that each spouse owned one-half of all property ac-
quired by the community, including income from both property and
personal services. If such ownership carried with it the right of report-
ing one-half of the community's income on each spouse's return, re-
sidents of these states would pay lower taxes than residents of common
law states, where income was the property of the spouse who earned it
and who was, therefore, solely liable for the taxes. The different tax
rules imposed upon residents of these two types of jurisdiction inspired
substantial legislation and litigation in the period between 1913 and
1948.
The Revenue Act of 1921 brought about a reduction in the high
tax rates in effect during World War I, resulting in a maximum com-
bined normal and surtax rate of fifty-eight percent for 1922.0 The
1921 legislation also carried with it a right for married couples that
was in most respects of no value: if they so wished, a husband and wife
could combine their incomes on one joint return.3 1 Because no separate
rate structure for such returns existed, the use of this privilege gener-
ally meant a higher tax burden in addition to joint and several
liability.3 2
The House of Representatives attempted to add to that law section
208, which was designed to eliminate the disparity of treatment be-
tween married couples residing in common law states and those resid-
ing in the community property jurisdictions. Section 208 would have
included all community income in the gross income of the spouse hav-
ing the management and control of the community property.3 3 The
Senate deleted this provision from the 1921 Act. 4
Because section 208 reflected a position held by the Treasury De-
partment for several years, its congressional defeat was not its final
bow. Indeed, the government's claims were upheld in United States v.
29. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and
Washington.
30. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 210, 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. 233-37.
31. Id. § 223, 42 Stat. 250.
32. A lower tax would be possible, of course, if one spouse had losses to offset
against the other spouse's income.
33. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
34. H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1921).
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Robbins,35 involving the California community property law in effect
before 1917.36 Even though the wife was granted a vested interest in
community property in the other seven community property states, the
broad powers of management granted the husband gave rise to doubts
about the continued efficacy of income splitting in those jurisdictions as
well. These doubts were resolved in the 1930 decision of Poe v. Sea-
born,37 but the statute of limitations was extended for community prop-
erty returns pending the outcome of that litigation.38
Seaborn3 9 and another 1930 case, Lucas v. Earl,4 gave the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to examine two income splitting arrange-
ments--one a creature of community property law, the other a result of
private contract. The Court determined that these arrangements had a
different effect insofar as their federal income tax consequences were
concerned. As noted earlier, the Treasury Department had attacked di-
vision of income in community property states, yet the Supreme Court
allowed such division in Seaborn, averring that "The law's investiture
of the husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the wife's
present interest as a co-owner." '41
The Court was not unmindful of the fact that this decision would
result in differential treatment for common law and community prop-
erty residents. 42 Earlier that same year, it had invalidated a contractual
arrangement for interspousal income splitting. Although the contract
involved in Earl predated the post-sixteenth amendment income tax by
twelve years, the Court felt that validating such an arrangement would
allow "the fruits [to be] attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew."'43 The net result of these cases was that residents of
community property states were able to benefit from lower taxes on
salary income if only one of them worked than were similarly-situated
35. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
36. An excellent discussion of this litigation appears in Bittker, supra note 1, at
1404-07 and sources cited therein.
37. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
38. H.R.J. Res. 340, ch. 495, 46 Stat. 589 (1930).
39. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
40. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
41. 282 U.S. at 113.
42. Id. at 117-18.
43. 281 U.S. at 115.
371
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residents of common law states. But because no gift tax existed then,
this disparity was not present with respect to income from property so
long as the common law state residents were willing to share
ownership.
Shifting property interests between spouses became costlier in
1932, when a permanent gift tax was enacted.," As ownership of com-
munity assets was automatically split by operation of the state commu-
nity property laws, the burden of this tax fell primarily on residents of
the common law states. The 1932 Revenue Act signaled a change in
the direction income tax rates were to take during the next several
years. The maximum rate of twenty-five percent in effect since 1928
was replaced by a new schedule with a maximum rate of sixty-three
percent.' 5 During the 1930s, Congress, in an attempt to balance the
budget at a time when fewer people were employed and paying taxes,
continually raised tax rates.46 Again, even if only one spouse were em-
ployed, the brunt of these rate increases fell on families in common law
states because income splitting was limited to the community property
states.
In 1941 Congress attempted certain reforms. The House Ways
and Means Committee proposed mandatory joint returns for married
couples. The committee believed this change would correct five "inequi-
ties" in the law: (1) a higher tax was paid by families where only one
spouse contributed to family income than by families where both
spouses contributed; (2) families living in community property states
paid smaller taxes than families living in other states; (3) families
whose incomes were attributable to earnings paid higher taxes than
families whose incomes were attributable to investments; (4) the option
of filing joint or separate returns always operated to the detriment of
the government and to the advantage of the taxpayers; and (5) taxes
were being reduced through the use of family partnerships, gifts and
trusts.' 7 The second and third committee objections have been dis-
44. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 245.
45. Id. §§ 11-12, 47 Stat. 174-77.
46. Id.; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680; Revenue Act of 1935, ch.
829, 49 Stat. 1014; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648; Revenue Act of 1938,
ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1941).
1 38 5:19801
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cussed earlier in this article,48 and the fifth is directly related to the
third. The fourth objection was, of course, correct, but the first objec-
tion suffered from a basic shortcoming. The committee considered the
income tax the only difference in disposable income separating a couple
for whom one spouse was the sole contributor and another couple, both
of whom were employed. In actuality, the second couple's work-related
outlays were higher,49 as was its other tax burden, the "Social Secur-
ity" tax.50
The Senate Finance Committee focused its reforms on the commu-
nity property/common law state distinction. It would have taxed
earned income to the spouse who actually earned it, taxed community
investment income to the spouse having management and control
thereof, and allocated deductions and credits to the spouse reporting
the income to which these items related.5 1 None of these proposals be-
came law.52
When it became clear that Congress would grant residents of com-
mon law states no relief from what they considered oppressive tax bur-
dens,53 several state governments created their own solution. In 1939
Oklahoma adopted an elective community property law. Oregon fol-
48. See discussion at pp. 34-36 supra. Not every community property state
spouse benefits from these income allocations. Each spouse must report one-half of the
community's income even though one of them, perhaps because of marital discord, ac-
tually receives a smaller amount.
49. See discussion at pp. 41 & 45 infra.
50. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, tit. VIII, § 801, 49 Stat. 636. This tax was
initially imposed at the modest rate of 1% on the first $3,000 of wages.
51. S. REP. No. 673 (Part 1), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1941).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1941). The 1941 Act almost
included a Senate provision that common law state residents could have used as an
income splitting device had they been as imaginative as the Boyters; alimony was to be
taxed to the recipient and deducted by the payor. Although deferred in conference, this
provision was added to the law in 1942. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 120, 56 Stat.
816-17. Also enacted in 1942 were rules making the estate and gift tax provisions con-
cerning community property more similar to those affecting property in common law
jurisdictions. Id. §§ 402, 453, 56 Stat. 941, 953. These changes were upheld in Fernan-
dez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
53. The 1938 Act provided for tax rates ranging from 4% to 79%. Revenue Act
of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 11-12, 52 Stat. 452-54. The 1942 legislation raised these rates so
that the range was from 19% to 88%. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 102-103, 56
Stat. 802-03.
S5:1980
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lowed suit in 1943.
In Commissioner v. Harmon," the Supreme Court analogized the
voluntariness of these self-help remedies to the contract provisions in
Lucas v. Earl,55 rendering them ineffective for federal income tax pur-
poses. In the next four years, these states, along with Nebraska, Michi-
gan, Pennsylvania, and the territory of Hawaii, adopted mandatory
community property systems which the Internal Revenue Service ac-
cepted as valid.5" With other states threatening to make this fundamen-
tal change in their basic rules of property law, Congress acted in 1948,
a year in which federal revenue demands were temporarily diminished
compared to what they were during World War II.57
Rejecting the 1941 proposals as being either too costly for married
individuals,58 or unduly burdensome for couples with earned, as op-
posed to investment, income,59 Congress adopted a separate tax rate
schedule for married individuals.60 If they chose to file a joint return,
the married couple would pay a tax which was twice as large as the tax
imposed upon a single person (or a married individual who filed sepa-
rately) with one-half of their combined income. Thus, the degree of
progression applied to married individuals' joint return rates was only
one-half that applied to all other taxpayers, at least until each group
reached the highest tax bracket.""
Little legislative activity occurred until 1969,62 when Congress de-
54. 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
55. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See pp. 37-38 supra.
56. I.T. 3743, 1945-1 C.B. 142-43; I.T. 3782, 1946-1 C.B. 84.
57. H.R. Rup. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1948).
58. This criticism was made with respect to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee proposal.
59. The Senate Finance Committee proposal was discarded on this basis.
60. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 114. This act also added estate
and gift tax marital deductions and a provision allowing married couples to split the
gift tax consequences of gifts either spouse made to a third party. Id. §§ 361, 372, 373,
62 Stat. 117-21, 125-28. These provisions gave married couples a clear advantage over
unmarried individuals insofar as property arrangements were concerned.
61. Id. § 101, 62 Stat. 111.
62. A separate rate schedule for heads of households was enacted in 1951, thus
reducing some disparities in taxation of married couples and single individuals, at least
in cases where the latter group had certain family obligations. Revenue Act of 1951,
ch. 521, § 301, 65 Sta. 480. In addition, a limited deduction for job-necessitated child
care expenses was added to the law in 1954. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214,
10
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cided that the 1948 legislation produced an unnecessarily large dispar-
ity between taxes paid by married couples and by single individuals
with the same income. 3 For example, the $6,070 tax paid by a single
individual with respect to a $20,000 taxable income was thirty-eight
percent greater than the $4,380 paid by a married couple with the
same income." Any extra costs of supporting two individuals on the
particular amount of income had to be offset by the economies of scale
occasioned by their living arrangement and the additional savings if
household tasks were undertaken by one spouse rather than by paid
household help.6 5 The latter advantage diminished in importance if
both spouses were employed, and in that situation their combined job-
related costs of earning the household's income could exceed such costs
borne by the single individual. In enacting a tax rate reduction for sin-
gle individuals, Congress established a rate schedule designed to limit
their extra burden to twenty percent above that imposed upon married
individuals enjoying the same taxable income.6
Using rates currently in effect for 1980,7 the relative tax burdens
of single and married individuals is summarized in the following
table: 8
68A Stat. 70-71. Because of the income phase-out imposed upon married individuals,
single workers were more likely to benefit from this deduction than were married
couples. Id. § 214(b)(2).
63. S. REp. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 260-62 (1969).
64. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 111, 78 Stat. 20. Viet Nam era
tax surcharges are ignored in these computations. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 90-364, §
102(a), 82 Stat. 251 (1968).
65. These computations also had to take into account the fact that no tax was
imposed upon the imputed income attributable to the homemaker spouse's services.
66. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 63, at 262.
67. Several bills providing lower tax rates for 1981 have been introduced into
Congress. The extent of any future tax reduction is at best speculative, particularly in
view of the revenue loss occasioned by combining a general tax cut with a reduction in
the marriage penalty.
68. I.R.C. § 1. The single individual's liability would be reduced to $17,642 if
personal services were his only income source. Id. § 1348.
41 1[5:1980
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TAX PAID AT VARIOUS INCOME LEVELS
Filing Status of Taxpayer:
Married, Married, Single
Taxable Joint Separate Individual's
Income Return Return Return
$ 5,000 $ 224 $ 531 $ 422
10,000 1,062 1,613 1,387
25,000 4,633 7,389 5,952
50,000 14,778 20,999 18,067
Since 1948, the joint return rates have been based upon the fiction
that each spouse earned one-half of the couple's combined income.6 9
Thus, the tax on a couple's joint return income of $50,000 is twice the
tax on separate return income of $25,000. Married individuals benefit
from this fiction whenever one spouse provides all their combined in-
come, one spouse has a loss for the year to offset against the other's
income, or one spouse's income is substantially smaller than that of the
other spouse.70 The couple described above would thus pay tax of
$14,778 using a joint return no matter how their $50,000 income was
derived. Had they filed separate returns their tax burden could have
been as high as $20,999.71 Even if both worked, separate returns would
result in a combined tax exceeding $14,778 whenever one spouse con-
tributed more than $27,100 (and the other, less than $22,900) of the$50,000.72
69. While the fiction has some validity in community property states in view of
the property rules there in effect, joint ownership is not a prerequisite to the use of
these rates by either common law or community property jurisdiction residents.
70. The benefit ceases, depending upon income level, when the lesser-earning
spouse contributes between 10% and 35%. At most income levels, the lesser earning
spouse need contribute only 20% to 25% for the penalty to be felt. JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION STAFF REPORT ON INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND
SINGLE PERSONS (1980), reprinted in Daily Tax Report, Apr. 2, 1980, at J-1, J-8
[hereinafter cited as JCT STAFF REPORT]. Other provisions benefit married couples
filing joint returns. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(3), 179, 1244. See also I.R.C. § 116, as
amended by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 404
(Apr. 2, 1980). Still other provisions require joint filing if married couples are to avail
themselves of the benefits offered. See I.R.C. §§ 85, 105(d), 1348.
71. This tax would result if all $50,000 were attributable to one spouse.
72. At these income levels, each spouse has reached the 49% bracket. For every
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/5
The Marriage PenaltyS5:1980
Single individuals do not benefit from this fiction. They pay tax on
their separate incomes, rather than on a pooled amount, no matter
what their living arrangements. Because the rate schedule they use ap-
plies lower rates to their income than would be applied to the same
amount of income produced by a married individual filing a separate
return, single taxpayers living together may pay a smaller tax than that
imposed upon a married couple with the same combined income. Re-
turning to the original example involving income of $50,000, the mar-
ried couple will pay $14,778 on a joint return no matter who earns the
income; on separate returns they will pay that amount or more. Two
single individuals would pay $5,952 each, a total of $11,904 if each
earns $25,000. Indeed, even if one of them earned more than $27,100
(and the other, less than $22,900), they would still pay a total com-
bined tax lower than that paid by the married couple in most situa-
tions.73 This savings, or what some commentators call the "marriage
penalty" is attributable to two factors: first, rates are lower for single
individuals than for married individuals filing separately; and second,
income tax is paid on income in excess of a "zero bracket amount."7' 4
Because this amount is $2,300 for a single individual, two such individ-
uals are entitled to exempt from tax the first $4,600 of their earnings.7 5
A married couple is limited to a maximum of $3,400 whether or not a
joint return is filed.
It should be noted that the 1969 legislation did not raise the taxes
paid by married couples; it simply did not lower them. As labor force
participation by married women increased in response to such diverse
factors as smaller family size, longer life expectancy, shorter marriage
span, 7 better educational opportunities,77 increased employment oppor-
dollar of income transferred from the lower to the higher earning spouse, the former's
tax consequences would drop to the 43% or lower bracket while the latter's would in-
volve the 49% or higher bracket. Thus, more of the combined income would be taxed at
higher rate levels, producing a higher combined tax.
73. At the $50,000 income level, a marriage penalty exists when the lesser earn-
ing spouse contributes as little as 20% of the combined income, a $10,000/$40,000
split. JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-8.
74. I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c).
75. Id. § 63(d)(2). Of course, each individual must have at least $2,300 of in-
come (in excess of the personal exemption) to take full advantage of the deduction.
76. Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicates that divorced women have the
highest labor force participation rate (74%) of all women aged sixteen or older. JCT
!
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tunities in nontraditional occupations, 8 inflation, and a higher mini-
mum wage,79 many couples found themselves in the situation facing
David and Angela Boyter; that is, they had to pay higher income taxes
because they were married.
While it appears the Boyters have failed in their particular at-
tempt to remedy the problem of the marriage penalty for 1975 and
1976, the changes in workforce participation by married women will
continue to put pressure on Congress to adopt one or more of the solu-
tions presently before it.8 0 Many couples, particularly those with minor
children, will find the Boyters' successful 1977 solution an unacceptable
alternative. Even if the Boyters ultimately prevail, the majority of simi-
larly situated taxpayers will be unwilling to undergo the expense and
effort involved in successive year-end divorces and the necessary year-
beginning marriages.81
Evidence was introduced at a recent House Ways and Means
Committee hearing that "work decisions of married women are far
more sensitive to tax considerations than are those of single persons or
married men."82 Thus, the marriage penalty may be viewed by many in
Congress as vitiating the effects of federal legislation providing equal
STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-18. In view of the shorter time span between mar-
riage and divorce, Congress amended the social security provisions allowing survivor's
benefits to a divorced spouse and now requires that the marriage have lasted only 10
years as opposed to the 20-year period previously required. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d) (Supp.
11 1979), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-216, tit. III, § 337(a), 91 Stat. 1548.
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, §
901, 86 Stat. 373).
78. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(1976)).
79. The minimum wage will increase from $3.10 per hour in 1980 to $3.35 in
1981. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. 1 1977) (added by Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2(a), 91 Stat.
1245). The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 5(a)(2),
75 Stat. 67, had increased it to $1.15, and further increases were enacted in 1966 and
1974.
80. At least one court held that remedies for the marriage penalty should be
formulated by Congress. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Any rush to the state divorce courts (assuming Boyter has closed the gates to
Haiti and the Dominican Republic) may mobilize those institutions to ask for Congres-
sional relief.
82. JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-10 and sources cited therein.
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educational and employment opportunities fot women. 83 Finally, to the
extent that relief, whether attributable to legislation or to self-help
measures, gives rise to a reduction in tax revenues, Congress would be
better able to predict the size of the revenue loss and adopt offsetting
measures if savings are available to taxpayers without regard to their
willingness to obtain divorces.
The plethora of bills pending in Congress vary in their provisions
from a deduction or credit for the dual income married couple to op-
tional single filing status. These proposals are discussed, along with
counterparts already in use at the state level, in the remainder of this
article.
Deductions or Credits for Job-Related Outlays
Because married couples who are both working outside the home
generally incur larger expenses for such items as meals, transportation,
and clothing than do couples with one worker and one homemaker, tax
deductions or credits frequently have been proposed to offset these ex-
tra costs. Although such deductions might be justified under section
162 as ordinary and necessary business expenses because they are in-
curred to allow the second spouse to take employment, bringing such
expenditures within the umbrella of the business expense deduction is
unlikely. The administrative burdens flowing from such an allowance
should not be underestimated. Indeed, several issues would present
themselves for immediate resolution.
First, a decision would have to be made as to which spouse's ex-
penses would be deemed the extra costs. Possible choices include the
spouse with the higher(lower) expenses, the spouse with the
higher(lower) earnings, and the spouse who entered the labor force
most recently.84 Once this decision is made, Congress can then move on
to the question of whether that spouse's total expenses for work-related
items are to be deducted or only those outlays in excess of the amount
he/she would otherwise incur. The latter choice is more satisfactory
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1976)(originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 92-318,
tit. IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (1976)).
84. In dealing with the credit for child care outlays, Congress chose the lesser
earning spouse. I.R.C. § 44A.
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from a theoretical standkoint inasmuch as only such additional outlays
are a necessary concomitant of earning the extra taxable income.
Moreover, if the prospect of "lavish or extravagant" deductions worries
Congress, automatic disallowance of the "fixed" portion of these out-
lays should be an acceptable solution. Incremental cost computations,
although no longer used for entertainment expenses, 85 have long been
an accepted practice in tax computations.86 Subjective questions could
be reduced if some statutory or administrative percentage were treated
as the incremental portion of the employee's actual costs. But basing
the deduction on incremental cost requires increased recordkeeping and
computations, which in turn magnify both the risk of taxpayer error in
computing tax liability and the cost of monitoring taxpayer compliance.
While allowing the full cost of certain items as deductions reduces the
computations involved, this step provides taxpayers little incentive for
controlling what are to a large extent "personal, living or family
expenses." '87
The real problem with allowing these items as deductions under
section 162 transcends mere difficulties in administration and computa-
tion. Such outlays must be viewed as business expenses under section
162, regardless of who makes them, or they should not be treated under
section 162 at all. If meals, transportation, and clothing expenses are to
be deductible for the second working spouse, the same treatment should
be granted those outlays when made by unmarried workers or the
spouse who is the family's sole breadwinner. Since Smith v. Commis-
sioner,88 in which the Board of Tax Appeals held that the wages of a
babysitter who was hired so that parents could work was not a section
162 expense,89 a "but-for" rationale has been insufficient to justify sec-
tion 162 status for outlays with a strong personal flavor. Too many
years of contrary interpretation should prevent use of section 162 here;
but, as the history of the child care credit 90 indicates, other means of
providing relief are available.
85. But see Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 C.B. 129.
86. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 123; Treas. Reg. § 1.213-I(e)(1)(iii)(1962).
87. I.R.C. § 262.
88. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
89. 40 B.T.A. at 1039.
90. I.R.C. § 44A.
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Congress enacted section 214 in 19549' to provide a limited child
care expense deduction for working taxpayers. Over the years this de-
duction has been broadened in its coverage and reformulated as a
credit. There are, however, fundamental differences involved between
expenditures for child care and other items of outlay, the size of which
is affected by workforce participation. The cost of child care is, for the
average family, a temporary phenomenon inasmuch as one's children
soon reach an age where custodial care becomes unnecessary. 2 The
outlays for one's own meals and similar items continue throughout the
term of workforce participation, a period of thirty years or longer. In
addition, child care outlays frequently decrease after the child reaches
first grade, when only after-school care costs become necessary.93 With
the possible exception of clothing, the worker's job-related expenses do
not follow this pattern.
Perhaps the most important distinction involved between these out-
lays is one of underlying policy. To reduce the risk that children will be
left unattended or perhaps warehoused in an inadequate (and not nec-
essarily inexpensive) setting, the tax revenue foregone by the govern-
ment could be viewed as an investment, the return from which may
eventually be received in the form of a reduced juvenile crime rate. In
addition, persons performing child care services may now, by virtue of
Internal Revenue Service reporting requirements,94 be spotlighted as
receiving gross income which otherwise might go unreported. It is ques-
tionable whether allowing outlays for other items would serve such pur-
poses. Because the items are already expenditures, only the incremental
cost can be justified as work-related.95 Second, because these items are
91. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214, 68A Stat. 70-71. The discussion of
this provision ignores the fact that some families send their children to nursery school
even though one spouse never works outside the home.
92. I.R.C. § 44A allows no credit for care of a person age fifteen or older unless
such person is incapable of caring for himself.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.214A-l(c)(3)(1976) disallowed a deduction for educational
expenses of a child in the first or higher grade. Compare-Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(0(2) &
(5)(Ex.3)(1956) with Treas. Reg. § 1.214A-1(c)(5)(Ex.2)(1976). See also Brown v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C..-.._, Nos. 8592-77 & 11685-77 (filed Oct. 24, 1979).
94. Internal Revenue Service Form 2441, used for claiming the child care credit,
requires the name and address of the person rendering care, the amount of money paid
such person, and, in certain instances, that person's social security number.
95. See discussion at pp. 45-46 supra.
471
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purchased from established businesses, their reporting would be of little
value in increasing taxpayer compliance.
While allowing a deduction or credit for these job-related costs
may not have the same appeal as that generated by child care out-
lays,9 6 an argument can be made for tax relief to offset costs which are
clearly job-induced and which do not result in benefits to the worker.
The most compelling example of such a cost is the social security tax
imposed upon most workers. If one spouse works and the other stays
home, a participation pattern upon which the social security system is
founded,97 the employed spouse is eligible to receive from this program
death benefits, disability benefits and retirement benefits based upon a
formula which takes into account the amount of his covered wages.9 8
The nonemployed spouse is eligible to receive retirement payments
equal to a percentage of those received by the employed spouse both
during that spouse's life and after his death.9 If both spouses work,
each pays the social security tax and is eligible for these benefits. How-
ever, to the extent the second spouse would be entitled to some or all of
these amounts even if he or she did not work and pay this tax, the tax
payment does not provide any benefits and can be considered a job-
related outlay for which there are no elements of personal enjoyment.
Generally, the spouse with the lower wage is the one for whom the
outlay is not proportionately covered by available benefits, so that
spouse is the most appropriate person to be granted any tax relief that
is legislated.
As explained above, unless one is willing to argue that job-related
expenses are deductible as employment-related for all workers, justify-
ing the deduction of any outlays other than for social security taxes
becomes difficult. Even a deduction in situations where the second job
was necessary to lift the family above a poverty level involves a rather
tenuous extension of the deduction currently allowed the moonlighting
96. See discussion at pp. 46-47 supra.
97. See REPORTS OF THE 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., Feb. 1980, at 3, 6, 12.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)&(i), 423 (1976) (benefits); id. § 415 (computation of
primary insurance amount).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b),(c),(e),(f) (1976) (benefit generally 50% of the worker
spouse's benefit during that spouse's life and 100% after his or her death).
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worker for transportation between jobs. 100 Section 43 already allows a
credit for low income families, regardless of the number of workers, in
situations where there is a dependent child. Moreover, in the low in-
come situation, relief could be increased by modifying section 43 to
provide a higher income phase-out for married individuals than is pro-
vided for single individuals.10 1 Differing income levels can be justified
because the requirement of a dependent insures that a different mini-
mum number of persons will be supported by the income, three for a
married couple and two for other taxpayers. Because section 43 benefits
are currently awarded whether one or both spouses work, such higher
limits for couples might be further conditioned on both spouses having
income, thus providing an alternative method of allowing for the extra
costs generated by the second worker in a low income family.10 2
While a deduction may be hard to fit within existing notions of
what constitutes an ordinary and necessary business expense, it cannot
be rejected summarily. If Congress decides that the marriage penalty is
sufficiently severe to require relief, then a deduction still must be con-
sidered, not as theoretically justified but rather as one method of for-
mulating such relief.
The decision between a credit and a deduction involves several
considerations. The revenue lost if a credit is used is probably easier to
predict than it would be if a deduction were chosen because the amount
of tax foregone in the latter situation is dependent upon the tax rate
otherwise applicable.108 Likewise, the use of a deduction, unless it is
provided for in section 62, could easily result in job-oriented deductions
alone exceeding the zero bracket amount. In that situation a large per-
centage of persons who presently do not itemize will be forced to keep
records of medical expenses, charitable contributions, and similar
items.104 Finally, a credit can be defended using an "ability to pay"
100. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261, 263; Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2
C.B. 86, 87 (Ex.7).
101. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 85.
102. I.R.C. § 44A, while not raising the child care credit when both spouses
work, precludes its use in most situations where one does not.
103. The forecasting problem is, of course, reduced if a ceiling is placed upon the
amount of the deduction.
104. On the other hand, if the deduction is listed in I.R.C. § 62, it can affect the
amount of the medical expense and charitable contributions deductions taken by per-
15:1980
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rationale as a means of granting a proportionately higher benefit to
lower income individuals. If, however, the credit were set at or below
the lowest tax rate percentage, no taxpayer would be better off with a
credit than with a deduction. 0 5
To the extent a credit percentage greater than the lowest marginal
bracket is chosen, the amount by which the credit exceeds the savings
attributable to the deduction can be viewed as a subsidy to lower in-
come taxpayers. Such a subsidy falls short of full cost recovery, how-
ever, in at least three aspects. Unless the credit is set at one hundred
percent of cost, it is not a full subsidy.' 06 Likewise, if the credit is not
refundable, it is not a subsidy to the extent it exceeds the current year's
tax liability.10 7 Finally, to the extent a taxpayer's outlays are subject to
an overall dollar limitation, there is less than a full subsidy once costs
exceed the limit.'0 8
The bills pending in Congress which allow a deduction10  or a
credit ' 0 for dual income couples adopt a combination of the ap-
proaches used in computing the child care and earned income credits.
These bills allow a percentage of the earned income of the spouse with
the smaller earnings to be deducted or credited in computing income
tax liability. They do not provide full relief, however, because the speci-
fied percentage is applied against the lesser of such income or a prede-
termined dollar limit."' Thus, the proportionate relief granted in the
sons who do itemize. Many of the bills now pending in Congress avoid both problems
by providing for a deduction which is in addition to the deductions listed in § 62 but is
not an itemized deduction. See, e.g., H.R. 6203, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 1(b) (1979).
105. Exceptions to this rule could occur if the taxpayer would use the zero brack-
et amount and get no benefit from the deduction or if the credit were made refundable,
as § 43 credits already are.
106. The earned income credit, while limited to 10% of the first $5,000 of wages,
does operate in this fashion for very low income taxpayers. I.R.C. § 43. This credit was
designed to offset the effect on low income workers of social security taxes, currently
6.13% of wages. The 10% credit exceeds the full subsidy at covered wage levels of
$6,700 or less (as well as for the minority of workers whose jobs are not covered by the
social security system).
107. The credit authorized by I.R.C. § 43 is refundable, however.
108. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 44A.
109. See, e.g., H.R. 6822, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6203, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979); S. 1247, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
110. See, e.g., H.R. 6798, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
111. H.R. 6822, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), would allow a deduction equal to
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higher brackets is limited, and a marriage penalty would still remain to
some extent."1 2
These proposals have several virtues: first, they involve fewer com-
putational difficulties than would be involved in allowing an offset for
actual costs or in allowing married individuals to file as single individu-
als;113 second, they limit the revenue loss engendered by such relief.11, 4
As between a deduction and a credit, it has been calculated that a
credit "would not be as effective as a deduction, per dollar of revenue
loss, in reducing marginal tax rates in the high income brackets, where
high marginal rates present the most serious problems."11 5
Because these proposals are limited to a percentage of earned in-
come, disparity of treatment still will remain between married and un-
married couples deriving income from investments. This disparity is
relatively more burdensome in one regard: income from investments is
not eligible for the maximum tax rate of fifty percent applied to earned
income.'1 6
the lesser of $2,000 or 10% of the earned income of the spouse with the smaller earn-
ings. This bill differs from the other deduction bills listed in note 109 supra in that its
relief is granted only if the lesser earning spouse's earned income is at least 20% of the
spouses' combined income. See the discussion at note 70 supra.
112. As the JCT STAFF REPORT indicates, "a cap means that there would be no
reduction in the marginal tax rate on a second earner whose earnings exceeded the cap
." JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-15.
113. See discussion at pp. 45-46 supra and at pp. 53-58 infra.
114. The JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-14 to J-16, provides the fol-
lowing estimates of revenue loss: a 20% deduction with a $20,000 cap would decrease
revenues $7.1 billion; a 10% deduction with no cap would decrease revenues $3.7 bil-
lion;.and a 10% deduction with a $10,000 cap would decrease revenues $3.2 billion. A
10% credit would result in an $11.7 billion loss even with a $10,000 earnings cap. On
the other hand, the revenue loss from optional separate filing would range between $7.0
billion and $8.7 billion, depending upon how deductions and investment income were
allocated. Id. at J-14. Mandatory separate filing, because of its effect on one-earner
couples, would actually increase federal revenues by as much as $18.1 billion. Id. at J-
13.
115. Id. at J-16.
116. I.R.C. § 1348. Once each wage earner has earned income in excess of the
amount taxed at rates of 50% or less, the flat 50% rale comes into effect and there is no
additional discrimination between married and unmarried workers. This effect occurs
at a much higher level of income with respect to investment income, which can be
taxed at rates as high as 70%.
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However, the discrimination does not always work against the
married couple. If two individuals receive substantial amounts of in-
come from property, as opposed to salaries, they probably will pay a
lower tax if they remain single. However, if substantially all such in-
come is received by one of them, a joint return favors the married
couple. The married couple also has an advantage over the unmarried
couple because the marital deduction is available to allow tax-free inter
vivos transfers of property between spouses .1 7
Mandatory and Optional Separate Filing
As an alternative means of providing relief, several bills would per-
mit married individuals to file separate returns using the rates applied
to single individuals. While most of these bills present this filing status
as an option," 8 a few of them would make separate filing mandatory. 19
In those situations where the existing joint return/separate return rules
give rise to a marriage penalty, optional or mandatory use of the single
return rates would provide almost complete relief. However, in those
situations where the married couple's income is earned primarily by
one spouse, the present system results in lower taxes. Mandatory sepa-
rate returns could thus result in increased taxes.120
Compulsory separate returns were effectively the rule prior to
117. I.R.C. § 2523. Because up to $100,000 of property can be transferred free
of gift tax, the income from this $100,000 can be shifted free of tax consequences.
There may be a $50,000 reduction in the ultimate estate tax marital deduction, but this
would usually be insignificant if income shifting were the goal, because the effect of
such reduction would not be felt until a future period. See I.R.C. § 2056.
118. See, e.g., H.R. 5012, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 4467, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). These bills use present
joint return rates. They would also ignore community property allocations and tax
earned income to the spouse performing the services. Id. § l(b)(1). While these bills
are generally treated as requiring separate filing, their actual effects are a return to the
pre-1948 rules and equality of treatment for common law and community property
state residents.
120. Such increases would occur at every income level, but the relative percent-
age of returns affected adversely would be greatest at family income levels below
$15,000 and above $30,000, at least in situations where investment income and deduc-
tions were allocated pro rata based upon earned income. JCT STAFF REPORT, supra
note 70, at J-14.
152 5:19801Nova Law Journal
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1948.121 Their use would once again reinstate the distinction between
salary earners and persons deriving substantial amounts of income from
property and the distinction between community property and common
law state residents. While schemes such as those proposed in 1941122
could be appended to such a measure, mandatory separate returns are
unlikely to gain taxpayer support from any group other than single
individuals.123
Optional separate filing creates a situation similar to that recog-
nized by the House Ways and Means Committee in 1941; that is, it
always will be employed to the detriment of the government. This ob-
jection loses much of its force, however, if the proposal is viewed as a
taxpayer relief measure from which the government is expected to lose
revenue.
Among the objections that have been raised to proposals allowing
married individuals to compute their taxes as if they were single are
those relating to the size of the revenue loss, complexities in record-
keeping, and notions of equity toward single individuals who would not
be granted that alternative. The revenue loss caused by optional
separate filing using single rates could be substantially greater than the
loss caused by allowing a deduction or credit.1 2' But in theory, the
same amount could be lost if every married couple who would benefit
from this proposal obtained a year-end divorce.
Alluding to this potential run to the divorce courts does not detract
from the certain revenue loss that approved separate filing would bring.
Indeed, Congress could prevent a self-help solution by adopting a new
definition of marital status, such as being married more than one-half
of the year or being married any time during the last half of the
year. 125 Alternatively, a rate schedule could be developed for cohab-
iting individuals to solve the problem raised by the Boyters' second
solution.126
121. See discussion at pp. 34-40 supra.
122. See discussion at pp. 38-39 supra.
123. Residents of community property states and couples deriving their entire
income from investments may, however, remain neutral.
124. See note 114 supra.
125. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 143(b)(1), 542(a)(2).
126. This alternative was not discussed in the JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note
70. It is discussed in Bittker, supra note 1, at 1398-99, and rejected as unfeasible.
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Another means of reducing the revenue loss would be to modify
the gift and estate tax marital deduction provisions. A reduction of the
allowable marital deduction could be implemented using a formula
designed to compensate the government for income taxes lost when a
couple files as single individuals. Such a modification can be justified
theoretically. If the couple had remained single, they would not have
been entitled to any marital deduction at all. To the extent that marital
status confers detriments a couple wishes to avoid, its benefits should
be treated in a consistent fashion.
Obviously, using the marital deduction to offset revenue losses has
its drawbacks. First, couples who benefit from joint returns will not be
affected, and they are frequently the couples deriving the greatest bene-
fit from the marital deduction. 127 Second, the proposal introduces yet
another set of calculations into each couple's decision about filing sta-
tus-this new set involving at best hypothetical facts as to future gift
and estate taxes. Finally, the need for the marital deduction is removed
if the couple is willing to obtain a divorce each time their wealth is held
in a sufficiently disparate fashion. Expeditious use of section 2516 will
thus reintroduce the question of sham in a context slightly different
from that in Boyter.128
The complexity involved in optional separate filing stems from the
fact that married couples would have to do at least three separate com-
putations of taxable income and tax: his, hers, and theirs. The compu-
tations of the separate incomes would be complicated further by the
recordkeeping requirements necessary to determine which items of in-
come and deduction are allocable to each spouse. 129 While this added
complexity no doubt would be an inconvenience both for the taxpayer
and for the government, it is presently a fact of life for residents of
several states, among them Ohio, New York and North Carolina.
127. High income couples who benefit from joint returns probably do so as to
both earned and investment income and can use the marital deduction to reduce taxa-
tion on transfers of property producing the latter. Their ability to do so was signifi-
cantly expanded by the changes in the gift tax marital deduction enacted in 1976. See
I.R.C. § 2523.
128. Unlike the marital deduction provided by I.R.C. § 2523, the benefits of
I.R.C. § 2516 are not subject to dollar or percentage limitations.
129. These problems involve more than a decision between separate and joint
checking accounts.
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Ohio residents already are forced to do what the optional single
filing status bills would require: that is, compute their taxes jointly and
separately and decide which is more advantageous. In fact, the Ohio
computation must be done twice, as state income taxes also must be
considered. Because Ohio has only one rate schedule, 130 used by all tax-
payers regardless of filing status, a joint state return would result in a
higher tax1 " than would separate returns whenever each spouse had
positive income.1 3 2 Filing a joint state return also would result in a
lower state tax if one spouse had a loss to offset against the other
spouse's income.
Obviously, the Ohio system favors the filing of separate state re-
turns. Nevertheless, joint returns comprise the majority of filings, 33 be-
cause Ohio law requires married individuals to use the same filing sta-
tus in filing their state returns as they use in filing their federal
returns.'"
As discussed earlier in this article, married individuals are rarely
'benefited by filing separate federal returns, 3 5 but the earlier discussion
proceeded on the assumption that only federal tax liability was rele-
vant. As Ohio taxpayers are frequently able to benefit from separate
state returns, some married couples are forced every year to make six
different tax computations to ascertain the lowest possible tax liabil-
ity.136 Because the maximum amount that can be saved by filing sepa-
rate state returns is five hundred -dollars, 37 the couple's computations
130. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.02 (Page 1980).
131. Like most other states, Ohio has a graduated rate schedule so that the tax
rate increases as income rises. Id.
132. There will be no marriage penalty if (1) the couple's total taxable income
was $5,000 or less or (2) one spouse's income was less than the personal exemption.
133. [1978] Omo DEP'T OF TAX ANN. REP. 54-55.
134. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.08(E) (Page 1980).
135. See pp. 42-43 supra.
136. Computations of each spouse's taxes and of their combined tax are required
at both the state and federal levels. Additional federal coinputations may be required
to ascertain eligibility for income averaging or the maximum tax on personal service
income. See I.R.C. §§ 1301, 1348.
137. The first $40,000 of income is taxed at graduated rates, with a maximum
tax of $900. All income in excess thereof is taxed at a flat 3 %. If each spouse earned
$40,000, the second spouse's tax before credits would be $900 on a separate return and
$1,400 on a joint return.
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are eased considerably if they start at the federal level and find that
joint federal returns save them more than that amount.138
The computation should also begin with the federal returns be-
cause the Ohio taxable income computation is based upon federal ad-
justed gross income. Thus, even in those cases where multiple computa-
tions are needed to determine which income combination yields the
smallest tax, the computations are not as complex as those required in
New York or North Carolina.
A typical family that will pay a smaller overall tax filing sepa-
rately for both Ohio and federal purposes is one in which both spouses
earn a salary of $10,000. The couple has no dependents, income other
than salary, or deductions beyond the zero bracket amount. Their com-
bined Ohio joint return income would be $18,700; on a separate return
each would report $9,350. Their combined federal joint return income
would be $18,000; on separate returns each would report $9,000. Their
comparative tax liabilities are illustrated in the table below, which is
based upon tax liability before credits.
TAXES PAID: FEDERAL AND OHIO
Jurisdiction Joint Return Separate Returns
Federal $2,745.00 $2,745.00
Ohio 267.50 137.00
Combined $3,012.50 $2,882.00
Ohio does provide a partial reduction in the extra tax burden im-
posed upon working couples who file joint returns. A credit against the
income tax is allowed whenever both spouses have federal adjusted
gross incomes of five hundred dollars or more from nonpassive
sources. 139 The joint filing credit is a sliding percentage of the tax oth-
erwise due.140 Like the federal credits which have been proposed, the
Ohio credit does not purport to offer, complete relief from the addi-
tional tax paid by those filing joint returns. 141 While optional filing sta-
138. The federal computations will frequently take into account items that are
not involved in Ohio tax computations, such as the requirement of a joint return if a
child care credit is claimed. I.R.C. § 44A(f)(2).
139. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(I) (Page 1980).
140. Id.
141. The maximum credit of 20% is available only if taxable income is $10,000
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tus has been proposed in the past in Ohio, thus far it has been rejected
as involving too great a revenue loss.1 42 Should the federal government
now adopt one of the optional filing status bills, Ohio, unless it changes
its existing law, will find that a larger number of its residents will be
filing separate state returns.
New York residents have far more freedom of choice than their
counterparts in Ohio. They are allowed to file separate state returns
even though joint federal returns are utilized.1 3 Because New York's
state tax rates are graduated steeply, 44 married individuals frequently
find separate state returns advantageous. So long as individuals remain
married, however, joint federal returns almost always are preferable to
separate returns using the existing rate schedules.
The complexities inherent in the New York return situation stem
primarily from allocation problems: records must be kept which can be
used to compute each spouse's proper share of the combined income
and deductions reported on the federal return. The same problem of
allocation exists in North Carolina, which has yet a third solution to
the problem of how married couples are to be treated for tax purposes.
North Carolina, which like Ohio and New York has only one rate
schedule, 4 5 does not allow the filing of joint state returns. 46 Because
its standard deduction is relatively low, 147 itemized deductions are com-
mon, and North Carolina residents are quite proficient at gathering the
data necessary to compute two separate state returns 48 and either sep-
arate or joint federal returns.
One means of reducing the recordkeeping problems, as well as re-
or less. Id.
142. Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, Ohio Department of
Taxation, to Gail Levin Richmond (July 22, 1980).
143. N.Y. TAx LAW § 611 (McKinney 1975).
144. Id. § 602(d) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The rates run from 2% to 14%.
145. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-136 (1979) with GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-
3601(b)(1980).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-152(e) (1979).
147. Id. § 105-147(22) (lesser of 10% of adjusted gross income or $550).
148. Even single individuals are required to keep multiple records, because
North Carolina allows several deductions not permitted in federal computations. Id. §
105-147(6)&(7) (federal airline excise tax; federal telephone excise tax; employer's
share of FICA tax on household help; a percentage of dividends received from corpora-
tions having income allocable to North Carolina).
57 1
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ducing the avoidance problems which could result if the bulk of deduc-
tions were taken by the spouse with the higher income, would be to
adopt the method which is already in use for couples when one spouse
is averaging income. While gross income and deductions authorized in
computing adjusted gross income are allocated to the spouse who pro-
duced them, all other deductions are prorated between the spouses us-
ing the ratios of their respective adjusted gross incomes.149 The same
allocation method is used in computing the maximum tax on earned
income, in this context to differentiate between earned and unearned
income as opposed to husband's and wife's income.150 In addition, to
reduce the government's data checking difficulties, the optional single
returns could have two columns, as is done in many states. 61 Each
spouse's income and deductions then would appear on the same form.
Thus, while complexity clearly will be increased using single filing sta-
tus, the extent of such increase need not be unmanageable.
The problem of providing equitable relief for single individuals
takes the entire discussion full circle to the changes which were made
in 1948 and 1969. In testifying before the House Ways and Means
Committee, a Treasury Department official noted four goals by which
tax policy has been guided: the income tax should be progressive; mar-
ried couples with equal combined income should pay the same tax; a
tax penalty should not be imposed on marriage; and a tax penalty
should not be imposed on becoming or staying single.152
As the official astutely noted, it is impossible to achieve all four
goals simultaneously.153 Perhaps the best that can be done at this time
is to chip away at the marriage tax penalty rather than to eliminate it,
thus limiting the unfairness caused to single individuals. In deciding
among various remedies, Congress must, of course, consider federal
revenue loss. However, it should not neglect an examination of alterna-
tives already in use at the state level and of the effect its decision will
have on states such as Ohio. No matter what is done by Congress in
149. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1304-3(c)(1966).
150. I.R.C. § 1348(b)(2).
151. E.g., North Carolina and New York.
152. Hearings on Income Tax Treatment of Married Couples and Single Per-
sons Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
Daily Tax Report, Apr. 2, 1980, at J-20 (statement of Emil Sunley).
153. Id.
158 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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the 1980s, the likelihood of eliminating all objections and self-help
remedies is minute. Indeed, as Bittker stated in 1975, "the chosen solu-
tion will itself turn out, sooner or later, to be a problem." 1"
154. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1463.
59 11 5:1980
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APPENDIX I
BILLS INTRODUCED IN THE 96TH CONGRESS
A. Deduction Allowed Based Upon Earnings of Lesser-Earning Spouse
1247
1877
2940
5829* 6822 7679
6203 7015
B. Credit Allowed Based Upon Earnings of Lesser-Earning Spouse or Other Formula
S. H.R.
3032
C. Optional Separate Filing
S.
336
D. Mandatory Separate Filing
6798 8199
684 3386 4884 7935
1012 3609 5012
1095 3742 5815
3085 4696 7788
H.R.
108 1390 2553 4467
140 1936 2916 4695
207 2077 3077 6209
1295 2268 3256 7975
*The Carter Administration has adopted the approach embodied in H.R. 5829.
160 5:1980 1
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APPENDIX II
STATE INCOME TAX PROVISIONS
A. States Imposing No Income Tax
Florida South Dakota Washington
Nevada Texas Wyoming
B. States Imposing No Income Tax on Earned Income
Connecticut New Hampshire Tennessee
C. States Imposing an Income Tax at a Flat Rate
Illinois Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Indiana Michigan
D. States Imposing an Income Tax at a Flat Percentage of Federal Liability
Nebraska Rhode Island Vermont
E. States Imposing an Income Tax Using Multiple Graduated Rate Schedules
1. States in Which Single Individuals Use the Same Rate Schedule as Married
Individuals Filing Separate Returns
Alaska* Idaho Oklahoma
Arizona Kansas Oregon
California Louisiana West Virginia
Hawaii Maine
2. States in Which Single Individuals Use a Lower Rate Schedule than Do Married
Individuals Filing Separate Returns
Georgia New Mexico Utah
F. States Imposing an Income Tax Using One Graduated Rate Schedule
1. States Requiring Joint State Returns When Joint Federal Returns Are Used
New Jersey Ohio
2. States Allowing or Requiring Separate State Returns
Alabama Maryland North Carolina
Arkansas Minnesota North Dakota
Colorado Mississippi South Carolina
Delaware Missouri Virginia
Iowa Montana Wisconsin
Kentucky New York
*before the September 1980 repeal of the Alaska income tax
611The Marriage Penalty15:1980
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